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Abstract
Standard theories of decision-making involving delayed outcomes predict that people should defer a punishment, whilst
advancing a reward. In some cases, such as pain, people seem to prefer to expedite punishment, implying that its
anticipation carries a cost, often conceptualized as ‘dread’. Despite empirical support for the existence of dread, whether
and how it depends on prospective delay is unknown. Furthermore, it is unclear whether dread represents a stable
component of value, or is modulated by biases such as framing effects. Here, we examine choices made between different
numbers of painful shocks to be delivered faithfully at different time points up to 15 minutes in the future, as well as
choices between hypothetical painful dental appointments at time points of up to approximately eight months in the
future, to test alternative models for how future pain is disvalued. We show that future pain initially becomes increasingly
aversive with increasing delay, but does so at a decreasing rate. This is consistent with a value model in which moment-by-
moment dread increases up to the time of expected pain, such that dread becomes equivalent to the discounted
expectation of pain. For a minority of individuals pain has maximum negative value at intermediate delay, suggesting that
the dread function may itself be prospectively discounted in time. Framing an outcome as relief reduces the overall
preference to expedite pain, which can be parameterized by reducing the rate of the dread-discounting function. Our data
support an account of disvaluation for primary punishments such as pain, which differs fundamentally from existing models
applied to financial punishments, in which dread exerts a powerful but time-dependent influence over choice.
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Introduction
When faced with the choice of whether to have a painful
medical or dental procedure right now or in the future, many
people opt to ‘get it out of the way now’. This tendency to expedite
rather than delay future pain seems to challenge the generality of
standard discounting models of inter-temporal choice [1–6]. It also
suggests a fundamental principle of human valuation likely to be
important for our understanding of pain and a range of health
behaviors [7–12]. The general phenomenon is typically referred to
as ‘negative time preference’ and is well replicated under
controlled conditions [13–19]. A putative explanation is that the
anticipation of primary punishments is itself inherently aversive,
referred to as ‘dread’ [18–22]. However, the way in which dread is
constructed as a function of both time and the aversiveness of
outcomes is not well understood. An additional unknown property
of dread is its stability in the face of biases, such as framing effects.
In particular, if dread is re-framed as relief from an imagined
higher amount of pain it might be possible to reduce or even
reverse negative time preference. In theory if framing could
eliminate dread preferences might revert to those predicted by
temporal discounting alone.
A simple account proposes that, when anticipating pain, people
treat each prospective unit of time as equally aversive. Here the
total dread of pain accumulates linearly with increasing delay,
such that the prospect of even minor pain ought to become
unbearable at a sufficiently long delay. Under an alternative
account, moment-by-moment dread increases as expected pain is
approached in time. Under this account prospective pain is
increasingly aversive with increasing delay, though at a decreasing
rate. A further possibility is that moment-by-moment dread is itself
prospectively discounted in time [19]. In particular, this predicts
that prospective pain has a future point at which it is maximally
aversive, being preferred both sooner or later. Thus we might
prefer to have a dental procedure now as opposed to next week,
but also next year as opposed to next week. Within the context of
experimentally accessible choices, these differing accounts make
testable predictions for the shape of the (dis)value function that
relates prospective pain to time.
To test these alternative models and the influence of framing
effects, we examined intertemporal choice over experienced
painful outcomes at different delays ranging from seconds to
around 15 minutes (Experiment 1: Figure 1). The outcomes
consisted of trains of brief moderately painful cutaneous electric
shock stimuli delivered to the dorsum of the hand. A total of 35
participants made binary choices between shock trains with
different expected shock rates (expressed in terms of the number of
shocks per episode) which occurred at different points in time,
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where the unit of time was a single trial. Chosen outcomes were
delivered faithfully at the relevant future time points. In order to
achieve longer delays, choices and outcomes were interleaved,
such that each choice was followed by a painful outcome, the
shock rate of which was determined by choices made earlier in the
experimental run. We collected intertemporal choice data in two
blocks: a block in which outcomes were framed as an increase in
shock rate from an expected baseline, referred to as the pain frame
and an otherwise identical experimental block in which outcomes
were framed as a decrease in shock rate from an expected
maximum, referred to as the relief frame. In addition we examined
intertemporal choices from 30 participants over hypothetical
dental appointments with varying degrees of dental pain at
different delays ranging from today to around 8 months
(Experiment 2).
We show at a group level, for both laboratory and hypothetical
outcomes, prospective aversion increases with increasing delay to
the delivery of pain, but does so at a decreasing rate, consistent
with a value model in which instantaneous dread increases
exponentially up to the time of expected pain, allowing dread to be
considered as equivalent to the discounted expectation of pain. For
a minority of individuals the prospect of future pain is maximally
aversive at intermediate intervals, consistent with an exponential
dread function being itself prospectively discounted in time when
making decisions. Framing outcomes as relief from pain attenu-
ated, but did not reverse, overall negative preference, an effect
which was best parameterized by reducing the discount rate
governing the expectation of pain.
Results
Experiment 1
Participant inclusion criteria. Of the 35 participants, 2
participants were excluded from the analysis after they
reported during the experiment that they did not find the
shock stimuli aversive. A further 8 deterministically chose
sooner pain, irrespective of the shock rate: these ‘maximum
dreaders’ were excluded from the modeling analysis, since the
shape of their preferences could not be reliably assessed using
the experimental choices offered (a larger difference in sooner
and later shock rates than those used here would be required
in order to encounter indifference points for these partici-
pants).
Group level time preference. At the group level, partici-
pants showed a strong preference for sooner pain, at the expense
of an increased number of shocks, confirming the existence of a
strong effect of dread in the experiment. Overall time preference
in the experiment is given by the mean probability across all
choices of choosing later shocks (S2) over sooner shocks (S1),
referred to as p(Choose S2). Since there are equal numbers of trials
in which S1.S2 as in which S2.S1, overall negative time
preference is indicated by p(Choose S2) ,0.5. Group mean
p(Choose S2) averaged across both frames and all delay lengths
was significantly less than 0.5, [mean p(Choose S2) = 0.29,
S.E. = 0.04, N= 33, One sample t(32) =25.23, p,0.001], this
was confirmed with non-parametric testing [median p(Choose
S2) = 0.34, One sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank test p,0.001],
indicating overall negative time preference. As a result, partici-
pants chose the larger pain on 32.6% (S.E. = 3.21) of choices
overall.
Dependence of group level time preference on
delay. Figure 2 shows mean p(Choose S2) on the two frames
across the 25 subjects included in the modeling analysis, as a
function of delay length, where the latter is expressed as the
difference in delay between the two choice options. Since there are
equal numbers of trials in which S1.S2 as in which S2.S1, and
option presentation is counterbalanced, p(Choose S2) at a delay
difference of zero is theoretically bounded at 0.5. Delay difference
(D2-D1) is binned into tertiles, corresponding to short (1–10 trials),
medium (11–20 trials) and long (.20 trials) delay differences. A 2-
way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a
significant main effect of frame [F(1,24) = 9.5 p=0.005)], whereby
participants chose sooner shocks less frequently in the relief frame.
There was also a significant main effect of delay [F(3,72) = 8.2;
p=0.002)], as well as a delay by frame interaction [F(3,72) = 4.2;
p=0.023)]. Non-parametric pair-wise comparisons between zero,
short, medium and long delay differences (across both frames
combined) revealed a significant decrease in p(Choose S2) between
zero and short delay differences [p(Choose S2, Short) ,0.5,
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p=0.004] and between short and
medium delay differences (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p=0.014),
but no significant change between medium and long delay
differences (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p=0.398), suggesting that
negative time preference decreases at longer delay differences,
rather than being constant. In particular the slope of the
dependence of p(Choose S2) on delay provides a proxy for the
rate of time preference. We therefore tested the hypothesis of
decreasing negative time preference by performing a further 2-way
repeated measures ANOVA, entering the slope of p(Choose S2)
between each category of delay difference as the dependent
variable. This second ANOVA demonstrated a significant main
effect of frame on the rate of time preference [F(1,24) = 15.5;
p=0.001)], as well as a significant main effect of delay
[F(2,48) = 4.4; p=0.033)], thus rejecting the null hypothesis of
constant negative time preference. There was no significant delay
by frame interaction in this analysis [F(2,48) = 1.6; p=0.205)].
Non-parametric pairwise comparisons revealed that the effect of
delay was driven by a significantly more negative slope between
short and medium delays than between medium and long delays
(Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p=0.013), consistent with diminish-
ing negative time preference. This suggests the rate of accumu-
lation of dread diminishes with increasing delay, suggesting that on
Author Summary
People often prefer to ‘get pain out of the way’, treating
pain in the future as more significant than pain now. One
explanation, termed ‘dread’, is that anticipating pain is
unpleasant or disadvantageous, rather like pain itself.
Human brain imaging studies support the existence of
dread, though it is unknown whether and how dread
depends on the timing of future pain. We address this
question by offering people decisions between moderate-
ly painful stimuli, and separately between imagined
painful dental appointments occurring at different time
points in the future, and use their choices to estimate
dread. We show that future pain initially becomes more
unpleasant when it is delayed, but as pain is moved further
into the future, the effect of delay decreases. This is
consistent with dread increasing as anticipated pain draws
nearer, which is then combined with a general (and
opposing) tendency to down-weight the significance of
future events. We also show that dread can be attenuated
by describing pain in terms of relief from an imagined
even more severe pain. These observations reveal impor-
tant principles about how people estimate the value of
anticipated pain – relevant to a diverse range of human
emotion and behavior.
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average instantaneous dread increases in time, rather than being
constant.
Classification of participants by individual time
preference. The group level data displayed in Figure 2 conceal
substantial heterogeneity in the response patterns of individual
participants. We therefore categorized the 25 participants whose
data contributes to Figure 2 according to their individual pattern
of time preference. We identified four mutually exclusive
categories: zero time preference, positive time preference, negative
time preference, and reversing time preference (Figure 3). Partici-
pants were classified as having zero time preference if p(Choose S2)
showed no significant deflections from 0.5 at any delay difference
(Binomial test, a= 0.05) (7/25, Figure 3A). The zero time
preference group chose the option with the smaller shock rate
on 88% of choices [mean p(Choose Smaller) = 0.88, SE=2.8],
demonstrating that this group did not simply respond randomly,
but tended to choose the less painful stimulus, irrespective of delay.
Participants were classified as having positive time preference if they
displayed significant increases in p(Choose S2), but no significant
decreases (Fisher Exact test, a= 0.05) (4/25, Figure 3B), as having
negative time preference if they displayed significant decreases in
p(Choose S2), but no significant increases (12/25, Figure 3C), and
as having reversing time preference if they displayed significant
increases in p(Choose S2), as well as significant decreases (2/25,
Figure 3D). The two participants with reversing time preference
both displayed initial negative, followed by positive time prefer-
ence, a pattern that would be consistent with prospective dread
being itself discounted in time.
Group level modeling analysis. We compared alternative
accounts for the computations underlying the observed patterns of
time preference by fitting a series of dread-discounting models of
increasing complexity. Each model parameterized the function by
Figure 1. Trial structure of the task in Experiment 1. A: sequence of two Choice Trials, demonstrating the display of outcome options and
outcome phases. The dotted arrow denotes how choices on previous trials determine expected shock rates on the future trials referred to by those
choices. B: An example No Choice Trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003335.g001
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Figure 2. Observed time preference: Experiment 1. Mean probability across participants (N=25) of choosing the more delayed shock outcome
(S2) over the sooner shock outcome (S1) [referred to as p(Choose S2)] as a function of difference in delay between delivery of S2 and S1 (D2 – D1),
expressed in units of trials. Delay difference (D2 - D1) is binned into tertiles, corresponding to short (1–10 trials), medium (11–20 trials) and long (.20
trials) delay differences. A: choice probabilities for all choices. At delay difference of zero, S1 and S2 would occur at the same time-point; since there
are equal numbers of trials in which S1.S2 as in which S2.S1, this plot is theoretically bounded to cross the probability axis at p(Choose S2) = 0.5,
represented by the blue and red square. Blue circles represent choice probabilities for the relief frame, red circles choice probabilities for the pain
frame. Error bars represent one standard error from the between subject mean. A 2-way repeated ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of both
frame [F(1,24) = 9.505; p=0.005)] and delay [F(3,72) = 8.156; p= 0.002)], as well as a significant delay by frame interaction [F(3,72) = 4.169; p= 0.023)]. B:
Choice probabilities for choices in which the more delayed option was a smaller number of shocks. At delay difference of zero, S1 and S2 would occur
at the same time-point, under which circumstance it might be assumed that participants would show preference for the smaller number of shocks,
denoted by the blue and red square.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003335.g002
Figure 3. Observed time preference in individual participants categorized by time preference. p(Choose S2) as a function of delay
difference, expressed in units of trials, for all 25 participants included in the modeling analysis. Choice probabilities shown are the mean of those on
the two frames. Delay difference scaling is identical that in Figure 2. Time preference is approximated by the slope of the choice probability lines. A:
participants with no significant time preference at any delay. B: participants who show positive time preference, but no significant negative time
preference at any delay. C: participants who show negative time preference, but no significant positive time preference at any delay. D: participants
with initial negative time preference followed by significant positive time preference at longer delays. Data are plotted as solid lines to assist
visualization of the choice patterns. Each gray line represents data from a single participant. The bold purple lines represent the between-subject
means in each category. At delay difference of zero, S1 and S2 would occur at the same time-point; since there are equal numbers of trials in which
S1.S2 as in which S2.S1, the plots are theoretically bounded to cross the probability axis at p(Choose S2) = 0.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003335.g003
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which future pain was disvalued, and therefore the value of each of
the binary choice options presented. Values were transformed into
predicted probabilities of choosing either option according to a
softmax activation function (see Methods). In order to draw
comparisons between models with differing architecture and
complexity, we calculated the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) for each model at the group level, according to a fixed-effects
scheme, by summing the BIC values for model fits to individual
data. The BIC favors models with higher likelihood estimates and
penalizes increasing model complexity, where lower values of BIC
indicate a more favorable model fit. Figure 4 displays choice
probabilities on the paradigm itself predicted by representative
parameterizations of each model (blue lines), as well as the mean
choice probabilities from each of the four participant sub-groups.
(Notably the shape is also dependent on the parameters of each
model and the parameter dependence of the more complex models
is illustrated in Figures S1, S2, S3, S4, S5).
Each model shares the same general form, but differs in the
manner in which dread varies as a function of time and outcome
magnitude. In all models, we assume that the total aversive value of
a prospective option (UTOTAL) is equal to the aversive value
associated with accumulated sum of future dread up until the time
(T ) of the actual pain plus the aversive value related to the pain itself:
UTOTAL~UDREADzUPAIN ð1Þ
In all models, we also assume exponential discounting of pain,
where cP represents the discount factor applied to the future pain,
and x represents the shock rate. Thus:
Figure 4. Model predictions on the task: Experiment 1. p(Choose S2) as a function of delay difference according to alternative models of
dread. Choice probabilities shown are the mean of those on the two frames. Delay difference scaling is identical that in Figure 2. The fine gray lines
represent mean p(choose S2) for the four participant subgroups shown in Figure 3. Data points marked by blue squares, joined with lines for
illustrative purposes, represent model data simulated at the parameter values denoted in each panel. These do not represent the results of model
fitting, but serve to illustrate the basic form of the alternative model predictions. Notably different parameterizations of the more complex models
can produce diverse shapes of choice frequency plot (see Figures S2, S3, S4, S5). Error bars represent one standard deviation of the binomial
distribution. In each case the softmax inverse temperature parameter, b, is set to 0.25, a representative value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003335.g004
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UPAIN~c
T
P
:x ð2Þ
Hence what differs between the models is the way in whichUDREAD
depends on x and T. Although different forms of discounting
function, such as hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic, are of impor-
tance in standard models of financial discounting, they have a
relatively subtle effect here, since the more complex functional
forms resulting from the addition of dread depend little on the
precise shape of the basic discounting function; we therefore adopt
exponential discounting for the sake of simplicity.
In the following analysis UPAIN is assumed to be a linear
function of the shock rate, x. Since there was no a priori reason
for this assumption, besides parsimony, we performed an
identical model comparison in which (negative) UPAIN was a
concave function of the shock rate. The parameters of this
concave utility function were derived empirically, separately for
each subject, and outside of the main model fitting procedure,
by fitting a three-parameter Weibull function to participants’
subjective ratings of stimuli with differing shock rates (shown in
Figure S6).
Model 1: The first model, the Null model, assumes that the
prospective disvalue of pain depends only on the stated number of
shocks, and not on the delay, i.e. UDREAD~0 and cP =1 such that:
UTOTAL~x ð3Þ
As shown in Figure 4A, this model predicted a net 50% probability
of choosing later shocks on our choice paradigm. This arose of the
fact that on half the presented options the later outcome carried a
larger number of shocks and on half the options the later outcome
carried a smaller number. The Null model did not adequately
capture observed choice patterns at the group level (BIC~5009).
Model 2: The second model, the Exponential Discount model,
extends the Null model to add an exponential discount rate for
pain, cP, but again assumes that UDREAD~0, such that:
UTOTAL~c
T
P
:x ð4Þ
The Exponential Discount model predicted overall preference for
later shock (Figure 4). This model improved the group-level
likelihood by comparison with the Null model, consistent with
some participants demonstrating positive time preference however
this was not sufficient to compensate for an increase in complexity
over the Null model (BIC~5133).
Model 3: The third model, which is the simplest model to
incorporate dread, assumes a constant benefit or cost from
anticipation accruing from any delayed outcome, which does not
scale with the size of the outcome or the delay to its delivery. In
other words, outcomes accrue a fixed cost from anticipation.
UTOTAL~AzUPAIN ð5Þ
Where UDREAD~A is the fixed constant of dread, assumed to be
negative. Despite the additional parameters, this Fixed Delay Cost
model substantially outperformed both the Null and Exponential
Discount models (BIC improvements of 368 and 492 respectively).
Model 4: The fourth model, Constant Dread, assumes that dread
is constant over time, where UDREAD, is given by the prospective
sum of dread across the delay:
UDREAD~a:
XT{1
t~0
x ð6Þ
Hence dread accumulates linearly when pain is viewed from the
perspective of an increasing delay. As in all dread-discounting
models discussed here, total dread is added to the discounted value
of the delayed pain itself in order to compute the overall disvalue
of delayed pain. Dread is weighted in this sum by the parameter a,
equivalent in this case to a proportionality constant for the linear
increase in dread. Figure S2 outlines the parameter dependence of
the Constant Dread model. The time dependence of total dread
embodied by this model substantially improved the model fit
compared with Fixed Delay Cost (BIC improvement of 321, see
Figure 5A).
Model 5: The fifth model, Exponential Dread, assumes an
increasing time-course of instantaneous dread, such that dread
increases exponentially until the actual time of pain. Parsimoni-
ously, the model assumes that the exponential rate governing the
increase in dread is identical to the rate by which pain is
discounted, cP, such that dread becomes simply equivalent to the
predicted (discounted) value of future pain. In addition, the
general form of the Exponential Dread model allows the
exponential rise of dread to be itself discounted in time by a
further discount factor, cD, such that:
UDREAD~a:
XT{1
t~0
cP
T{t:c tD
:x ð7Þ
Figure S2 outlines the parameter dependence of the general
form Exponential Dread model. We tested this general form, as
well as two nested variants. The first variant, which we term
Undiscounted Exponential Dread assumes that dread is not itself
prospectively discounted, such that cD~1:
UDREAD~a:
XT{1
t~0
cP
T{t:x ð8Þ
Figure S3 outlines the parameter dependence of this Un-
discounted Exponential Dread model, which predicts that
preference for sooner shock saturates at longer delays. The second
variant, Restricted Discounted Exponential Dread, assumes that
the rate of exponential rise of dread is the same as the rate of
exponential discounting of dread, such that cD~cP~c, giving:
UDREAD~a:
XT{1
t~0
cT{t:ct:x ð9Þ
Which further simplifies as follows:
UDREAD~a:
XT{1
t~0
cT :x ð10Þ
UDREAD~a:c
T :T :x ð11Þ
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Figure 5. Model comparison and framing effects: Experiment 1. A: Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), summed across participants (N=25)
for the alternative models. Lower values of BIC indicate better fits of the model. Exponential Dread outperformed other models, with Undiscounted
Exponential Dread providing the most parsimonious fit at the group level, indicated by the red circle. B: Mean frequency of choosing sooner pain
across all choices by all participants in either frame. Error bars show one standard error from the mean in each direction. Two-tailed paired t-test
showed significant difference between the two frames t(32) = 2.84, p= 0.0077. This result was confirmed with non-parametric testing for differences
between paired samples using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, which revealed significant differences between the two medians (N=33, Z=22.6,
p= 0.0093). C: Results of fitting the general form Exponential Dread model to both pain and relief frames, whilst restricting which parameters were
allowed to vary between frames. In the unrestricted framing model (All-Framing) all four parameters, the inverse softmax temperature, b, the
Disvalue of Future Pain
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All forms of the Exponential Dread model are capable of
predicting diminishing negative time preference. Furthermore, if
dread itself is prospectively discounted (cDv1), reversals of time
preference can occur, such that prospective pain is maximally
aversive at intermediate delays (Figures S2 and S3).
Consistent with the behavioral observation of diminishing
negative time preference, (Figure 2) Exponential Dread models
were the best performing at the group level (BIC improvement of
149 over Constant Dread for general form Exponential Dread).
The restricted variants were favored over the general form, with
Undiscounted Exponential Dread providing the most parsimoni-
ous fit out of all models tested at the group level (BIC
improvement of 150 over the general form), followed by Restricted
Discounted Exponential Dread (BIC improvement of 57 over the
general form).
Group level framing effects. Across participants, the mean
frequency of choosing sooner pain in the pain frame was 73.7%
(S.E. = 3.95) and 67.3% (S.E. = 4.22) in the relief frame (Figure 5B).
A two-tailed paired t-test showed that this difference was
significant: t(32) = 2.84, p=0.0077. The result was confirmed
with non-parametric testing for differences between paired
samples using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, which revealed
significant differences between the median choice frequencies
(N=33, Z=22.6, p=0.0093).
Analysis of the framing effect was extended using the general
form Exponential Dread model to test which parameters of the
model best accounted for the differences in intertemporal choice
between pain and relief frames. Thus, we performed a second model
comparison whilst restricting which parameters were allowed to
vary between frames. The general form model was chosen for this
analysis in order that predictions regarding the basis of the framing
effects were not dependent on accepting a specific version of the
model. The results of model comparison across frames are shown
in Figure 5C.
The two models with the lowest BIC were the model in which a
is allowed to be free (i.e. the discount factors cP and cD and the
choice temperature b are fixed; BIC =4142), and the model in
which cP is allowed to be free (i.e. the dread discount factors cD,
the dread weighting parameter, a, and the choice temperature b
are fixed; BIC =4115), with a BIC difference of 27, indicating
substantial support for the cP-framing model. These results suggest
that the framing effect was most parsimoniously accounted for by
changes in the discount rate governing the rate of increase in the
dread of future pain, cP. Likelihood ratio tests rejected the (null)
No-Framing model in favour of the cP-Framing model at both the
group (fixed effects) (LR= 10108:1, x2= 497.3, p,0.001, d. f.=25)
and individual (Mean individual LR=2088:1, x2= 19.9,
p,0.001, d. f.=1) levels.
Modeling with non-linear utility of pain. Within the set of
experimental choices offered, absolute shock rate is weakly
correlated with the delay difference (Pearson r=0.12) between
the two options. As a result, it is possible that some of the variance
in the data could be accounted for by the shape of the utility
function for pain, independent of the effect of delay. To examine
the contribution of variable utility, we fitted a version of the Null
model in which the pain utility function (implemented as a three-
parameter Weibull function) was allowed to freely vary between
subjects. This model (BIC~4881) illustrated that the utility
function alone was unable to account for the full range of the
observed findings. We performed further model comparison of the
dread-discounting models under a concave utility function for
pain. The rank ordering of the model fits was unchanged under
concave utility, whilst the overall quality of fits was higher with
linear utility (Figure 6), demonstrating that the results remain
robust to changes in the utility function of pain. We could
speculate from these results that subjects, having only sampled the
extremes of shock rate prior to taking part in the experiment, did
not have precise insight into the shape of their own utility functions
for shock rate, and may have therefore used linear utility as a
heuristic.
Modeling analysis of sub-groups. At the sub-group level,
we hypothesized that the Null model would perform best in the
zero time preference group, that Exponential Discounting would
perform best in the positive time preference group, that Un-
discounted Exponential Dread would perform best in the negative
time preference group and that either general form or Restricted
Discounted Exponential Dread would perform best in the reversal
group. In the zero time preference group, the two models with the
lowest BIC estimates were indeed the Null model (BIC =755) and
Undiscounted Exponential Dread (BIC =793), suggesting evi-
dence in favor of the Null model in this group. In the positive time
preference group the two models with the lowest BIC estimates
were Fixed Delay Cost (BIC =961) and Exponential Discounting
(BIC =964), with a BIC difference of 3.5, unexpectedly providing
weak evidence in favor of the Fixed Delay Cost model in this
group. Closer inspection revealed that the improved fit of this
model was driven by a single participant, who displayed a degree
of negative time preference on the pain frame. As expected, in the
negative time preference group the best performing model was
Undiscounted Exponential Dread (BIC =1868), followed by
Restricted Discounted Exponential dread (BIC =1941). Also as
expected, in the reversal group, the best performing model was
Restricted Discounted Exponential dread (BIC =370), followed by
the general form Discounted Exponential Dread (BIC =372)
(followed by Undiscounted Exponential Dread, BIC =374),
indicating evidence in favor of dread being discounted in this
sub-group. Notably, alternative parameterizations of the general
form Exponential Dread model are able to account for the
patterns of time preference displayed by each of the four sub-
groups, as shown in Figure 7, which presents data from a single
participant within each group, along with the maximum likelihood
estimates predicted by the general form Exponential Dread model.
The cP-framing model provided the most parsimonious account
of between-frame differences for all participant sub-groups.
Framing effects were most prominent in the negative and reversing
time preference groups, which together accounted for all
participants with significant behavioral framing effects in the
expected direction (9 participants, Fisher exact test p,0.05).
Consistent with this, cP was significantly higher in the pain frame
(less discounting of pain, faster accumulation of dread) than in the
relief frame in the negative time preference group [Wilcoxon signed
rank test, d. f.=14, p=0.006]. No subjects in the zero time
preference group showed significant framing effects, and there
discount parameters, cP and cD , and the anticipation parameter, a, were applied separately to each frame, yielding an eight parameter model. In the
fully restricted framing model (No-Framing) all parameters were constrained to be equal across frames, yielding a four-parameter model. The best fit,
indicated by the red circle, was provided by a four-parameter model in which b, cD and a were fixed across frames, leaving between-frame differences
explained by differences in cP (cP-Framing). Likelihood ratios are displayed at both the group level and the individual level, strongly favoring the cP-
Framing model over the No-Framing model at both the group (fixed effects) (LR = 10108:1, x2 = 497.3, p,0.001, d. f.= 25) and individual levels (Mean
individual LR = 2088:1, x2= 19.9, p,0.001, d. f.=1) .
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003335.g005
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were no significant between-frame differences in cP in the zero
time preference sub-group [Wilcoxon signed rank test, d. f.=11,
p=0.57]. A single subject in the positive time preference group
showed a significant behavioral framing effect in the reverse
direction (higher discounting in the pain frame), in this case
parameterized as a lower cP in the pain frame, suggesting that the
direction of the framing effect described here relies on subjects
displaying a significant degree of dread.
Experiment 2
Participant inclusion criteria. All 30 participants were
included in the analysis.
Group level time preference. In Experiment 2 participants
made 70 choices between two possible timings for a hypothetical
dental appointment. They were informed that the appointment
would last for 15 minutes and that the experience would be
painful. Participants were also informed that the appointment was
routine and that the timing would not affect their dental health.
They were asked to imagine that the dental surgery was situated
close to their home, such that they could attend an appointment
almost immediately should they so wish. The severity of the pain
for each possible appointment was described as a percentage,
where 100% represented the worst imaginable dental pain. Since
outcome magnitude was described in experiential terms, a linear
utility function was assumed over percentage pain intensities. The
appointment delays ranged from ‘‘today’’ to 237 days in the
future, and were described in units of days. As for Experiment 1,
there were an equal number of choices for which the larger
magnitude pain was the sooner option as choices in which the
(identical) larger magnitude pain was the later option, therefore
Figure 6. Model comparison with non-linear utility: Experiment 1. The results of an identical model comparison, performed with subject-
specific non-linear utility functions for pain, derived from subjective ratings of stimuli with differing shock rates, as shown in Figure S6. Blue bars
represent summed BIC values for linear utility models, gray bars the BIC values for non-linear utility models. For each alternative model using linear
utility provided better model fits, as indicated by lower BIC values. Importantly, the rank order of the models was largely unchanged using non-
linear utility, the only exception being that the general form Exponential Dread model outperformed the Restricted Discounted version with non-
linear utility, but not with linear utility. The green bar labelled ‘‘Fit Utility Only’’ represents the result of implementing the Null model with a freely
fitted three-parameter Weibull utility function, showing that a variable utility function alone was unable to account competitively for the observed
data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003335.g006
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the probability of choosing the later option, in this case p(Choose
A2) where A2 refers to Appointment 2, reflects time preference in
the same manner as for Experiment 1.
Consistent with Experiment 1, at the group level, participants
showed a strong preference for sooner dental appointments, at the
expense of more severe dental pain: group mean p(Choose A2)
averaged across all delay lengths was significantly less than 0.5,
[mean p(choose A2) = 0.38, N=30, SE=0.025, One sample
t(29) =24.56, p,0.001], a result which was confirmed with non-
parametric testing [median p(Choose A2) = 0.39, One sample
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test p,0.001], indicating overall negative
time preference.
Dependence of group level time preference on delay. To
assess the dependence of time preference on delay at the
behavioral level, and to facilitate comparison with Experiment 1,
delays to the later dental appointment were grouped into short (1–
5 days), medium (13–32 days) and long (89–237 days) categories. A
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main
effect of delay [F(3,116) = 8.1 p,0.001)]. Non-parametric pair-
wise comparisons between zero, short, medium and long delays
revealed a significant decrease in p(Choose A2) between zero and
short delay differences [p(Choose A2) ,0.5, Wilcoxon Signed
Rank test, p,0.001], between short and medium delay differences
(Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p=0.0025), and between medium
and long delay differences (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p=0.022),
suggesting consistent negative time preference at the group level.
Figure 8A displays the group mean p(Choose A2) for Experiment 2
at all delay lengths offered. The data reflect the finding of
consistent negative time preference. Diminishing negative time
preference with increasing delay can be clearly appreciated from
the shape of the plot.
Classification of participants by individual time
preference. We categorized the 30 participants according to
their individual pattern of time preference, using an identical
method as for Experiment 1: 12 out of 30 participants showed zero
time preference, 3 out of 30 showed positive time preference, and
the remaining 15 out of 30 showed negative time preference. In this
experiment, no participants displayed reversing time preference, i.e.
none displayed significant increases in p(Choose A2), as well as
significant decreases. Figures 8B–D display group mean p(Choose
A2) at each delay length for the zero, positive and negative time
preference groups respectively.
Group level modeling analysis. The results of group level
model comparison for Experiment 2 are shown in Figure 9.
Consistent with the shape of the group level choices (Figure 8),
Undiscounted Exponential Dread was the best performing model
at the group level (BIC =1036), followed by Constant Dread
(BIC =1115). These two models outperformed both the restricted
variant of Discounted Exponential Dread (BIC =1162), general
form Discounted Exponential Dread Constant Dread
(BIC =1179), Fixed Dread Cost (BIC =1418). Exponential
Discounting (BIC =1784) and the Null model (BIC =1791).
Modeling analysis of sub-groups. At the sub-group level,
we hypothesized that the Null model would perform best in the
zero time preference group, that Exponential Discounting would
perform best in the positive time preference group and that
Undiscounted Exponential Dread would perform best in the
negative time preference group. In the zero time preference group,
the best performing model was in fact Undiscounted Exponential
Dread (BIC =218), followed by the restricted form of Discounted
Exponential Dread (BIC =229), followed by the Null model
(BIC =232). This unexpected result is consistent with the
observation that participants in the zero time preference group
displayed a small but consistent degree of negative time
preference, as shown in Figure 8B. In the positive time preference
group the two models with the lowest BIC estimates were
Exponential Discounting (BIC =176) and Undiscounted Expo-
nential Dread (BIC =179), a BIC difference of 3.1, providing
weak evidence in favor of Exponential Discounting in this group.
Similarly, as predicted, in the negative time preference group the
best performing model was Undiscounted Exponential Dread
(BIC =633), followed by Constant Dread (BIC =674).
Discussion
We compared alternative accounts for how aversive (dis)value is
constructed as a function of time using two experimental
paradigms in which participants made choices between painful
Figure 7. Time preference of sample participants on Experiment 1 and fits of the (discounted) Exponential Dread model. Observed
p(Choose S2), combined across both frames, as a function of delay difference, expressed in units of trials, is displayed for a single participant from
each of the four subgroups shown in Figure 3, indicated by the purple circles. Delay difference scaling is identical that in Figure 2. Data simulated
from the general form Exponential Dread model at the maximum likelihood parameter estimates for each participant, subsequently combined across
frames, are plotted as cyan squares. Error bars represent one standard deviation of the binomial distribution. A: a participant with zero time
preference B: a participant with positive time preference (left hand column). C: a participant with negative time. D: a participant with reversing time
preference: showing initial negative time preference reverting to positive time preference at longer delay differences. The general form of the
Exponential Dread model adequately captures all four patterns of time preference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003335.g007
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outcomes occurring at different delays in the future: in the first the
outcomes were moderately painful electric shocks which were
experienced for real, and in the second the outcomes were
hypothetical painful dental appointments.
In accordance with previous studies we found that most
participants (26 out of 33 in Experiment 1, see Table S1 and
Text S1) exhibited dread for pain. These participants preferred to
experience the same pain sooner rather than later and were willing
to accept more pain in order to hasten its occurrence. The
observed behavior for both real and hypothetical painful outcomes
revealed that negative time preference initially increased with
increasing delay, but saturated at long delay. This pattern was best
accounted for by a dread-discounting model in which dread
increases exponentially as pain is approached in time. The total
utility from dread is then given by the prospective sum of dread,
where the extent to which an individual incorporates dread can be
described in terms of the weighting parameter, a. We termed this
model Exponential Dread. We showed also that dread is
modulated by relief framing, an effect which was captured by
modulation in the rate of instantaneous dread increase.
Our findings extend those of Berns and colleagues, who
compared a Constant Dread model and an Exponential
Figure 8. Time preference for a hypothetical painful dental appointment: Experiment 2. Observed p(Choose A2) is plotted as a function of
the delay to the later appointment; the sooner appointment was always at 0 days, i.e. ‘‘today’’. Error bars represent one standard error from the group
mean. A: group mean p(Choose A2) for all participants (N= 30). B: mean p(Choose A2) in the zero time preference group (N= 12). C: mean p(Choose
A2) in the positive time preference group (N= 3). D: mean p(Choose A2) in the negative time preference group (N= 15).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003335.g008
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Discounting model without dread in the context of choice between
delayed shocks predicted by a cue [18]. In the latter study, the
Constant Dread model provided better fits to both the behavioral
data and the BOLD response in several regions of interest (right
primary and secondary somatosensory cortices, caudal anterior
cingulate cortex and right posterior insula) than the model without
dread, demonstrating a neural correlate of dread. We have used
behavior to probe the dependence of dread on delay, and in so
doing provide direct empirical support for Exponential Dread,
corresponding to the original form of the anticipation-discounting
model proposed by Loewenstein [19].
We suggest that both moment-by-moment dread and the
temporally discounted value of pain itself increase as pain is
approached in time. This leads to a putative simplification,
embodied by the Exponential Dread model, that both are one and
the same signal – simply the instantaneous anticipation of pain. An
increasing aversiveness by time function for the anticipation of
pain bears similarity to observations in studies of fear conditioning.
For example, the ability of fear to potentiate the startle response is
specific to the learned time interval between conditioned stimulus
(CS) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) [23–26]. Thus, following
the CS, fear behaviors increase to reach a maximum at the
predicted time of UCS onset. Similarly, in human subjects
instructed to expect shock after a stated delay, physiological
measures of fear such as galvanic skin response (GSR) and heart
rate both increase roughly exponentially in the period immediately
preceding the predicted time of shock delivery [27–29]. Conse-
quently, the anticipation of pain can be considered as resembling a
temporally discounted value signal, assuming a low level when
pain is distant and increasing as pain is approached. Indeed, we
Figure 9. Model comparison for Experiment 2. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), summed across participants (N=30) for the alternative
models. Lower values of BIC indicate better fits of the model. Undiscounted Exponential Dread provided the most parsimonious fit at the group
level, indicated by the red circle.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003335.g009
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suggest it is possible that the overall motivational value of pain
reflected across many instances of pain-related decision-making
incorporates, to a varying degree, a prospective sum of this
anticipation, comprising the dread term of the dread-discounting
model.
A small proportion of participants (2 out of 25 in Experiment 1)
exhibited negative time preference which reverted to positive time
preference at longer delays, consistent with an Exponential Dread
model in which dread is itself prospectively discounted. However,
we acknowledge that we have insufficient evidence to support this
conclusion at the group level, and we do not observe this pattern
for hypothetical outcomes over the range of delays offered. The
key prediction here is that the (negative) value function for pain
has a maximum at an intermediate time point, as opposed to
increasing or decreasing steadily across time. Such maxima would
predict dynamic preference reversals for delayed aversive
outcomes, whereby people would be most likely to attempt to
avoid the dreaded outcome at the point of maximal aversion. We
therefore speculate that high discounting of dread may contribute
to avoidant psychopathology [10,11,30,31]. We propose that a
general form Exponential Dread model is well-placed to param-
eterize individual differences in the valuation of future pain, and a
possible direction for future research will be to investigate the
discounting of dread in clinical populations.
Whilst dread clearly represents a departure from economic
theories of behavior, such as Rational Choice theory [32,33], the
dread-discounting models presented here retain assumptions of
intertemporal independence. In other words the models assume
that prospective dread is simply the sum of the instantaneous
anticipation of future pain. This assumption is particularly relevant
to the design of Experiment 1, which interleaves choices and
outcomes, such that participants can be making choices about
future pain, whilst currently anticipating the results of their
previous choices. If participants keep track of their previous
choices, dread from previous choices would overlap with the
estimated dread of the current choice options. Additive indepen-
dence of dread entails that previous dread simply adds the same
amount to the value of both choice options and therefore is
eliminated from the value of the current choice options (this is the
case since the softmax activation function subtracts the value of the
two choice options, see Methods: Equation 19). Whether dread
from different time periods indeed simply adds together linearly in
this manner forms an important question for future study.
We show that choices that expedite pain were more frequent
when the same outcomes were framed as an increase in pain than
when framed as a decrease in pain, a demonstration that framing
biases exert a strong effect in situations associated with dread.
Modeling analysis of participant subgroups indicated that the
framing effect we report is only present in participants who display
significant dread (Figures S8 and S9). The observation of framing
may be similar to that which underlies the well-known sign effect,
in where discount rates for rewards are typically different from
those for punishments [34,35]. A model in which between-frame
differences in temporal value functions were determined by
changes in the rate of accumulation of dread, here equivalent to
the discount rate for pain, provided the most parsimonious
account for these effects of framing, suggesting that differential
anticipation is a sufficient explanation for the sign-effect in this
context. This observation is however bound to the framework of
the dread-discounting model. It is possible for example that
framing induced changes in the instantaneous utility function for
pain [34].
We have suggested that increasing instantaneous dread may
represent a fundamental principle of anticipated aversion. A
multitude of factors, which may interact with the effect of delay,
are likely to influence the valuation of future pain in real-world
contexts. Nevertheless we show the functional form of dread
appears conserved across two very different experimental
contexts: in the context of real painful outcomes experienced
at delays of up to approximately 15 minutes, and in the context
of an imagined painful experience at delays of up to
approximately 8 months. A relevant observation here is that
the form of the dread function appears to demonstrate scale
invariance, as evidenced by a similar shape when making
choices over delays expressed in different units of time (trials or
days). As a result the magnitude of prospective dread at a given
delay is likely to depend upon the psychological construal of the
time scale. Scale invariance is a feature of many psychometric
functions, including temporal discounting with rewarding
outcomes [36,37,38], and the scale invariance of dread presents
a target for future study.
Why dread is a consistent feature of pain related decision-making
is unclear. One possibility is that cognitive and emotional
mechanisms associated with preparation for pain interfere with
other behavioral processes, such as those involved in reward
seeking. It is known for example that non-contingent prediction of
shock, signaled by a conditioned stimulus, can reduce the vigor of
instrumental responding, an effect referred to as conditioned
suppression [26]. Dread, as the prospective sum of anticipated
punishment, may therefore signal the likely degree of behavioral
suppression during the delay. Another possibility is that dread
represents a form of ‘stimulus substitution’ – the observation that
cues associated with the prediction of aversive events evoke some of
the core properties of the aversive events they predict themselves
[12,39]. This can be viewed as a form of aversive impulsivity –
assumed to be a maladaptive inheritance of decision-making
dispositions that are shaped by earlier evolutionary niches. An
alternative explanation would be that people have an increasing
uncertainty with time that they can engage in an adequate physical
or psychological response to deal with pain. Further research is
required to uncover the constitutive mechanisms of dread, which is
of importance for clinicians and health policy makers, since
knowledge about the shape of pain value functions and their
modulation by framing may be useful when presenting options
regarding potentially painful investigations and treatments.
Methods
Ethics statement
The research received approval from the National Health
Service National Research Ethics Service, Central London
Research Ethics Committee 3 (Ethics number 08/H0716/6,
Amendment AM1). All participants gave informed consent before
taking part in the study.
Experiment 1
Participants. Thirty-five participants (18 females) took part
in the experiment. Participants were recruited by advertisement on
the website of the University College London Psychology Subject
Pool. All experiments were carried out at the Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London and each
session lasted around 2 hours. All participants gave full informed
consent prior to the experiment. Participants were briefed that
they would be making choices between different numbers of
moderately painful electric shocks that would be delivered at
different points in time.
Procedure and design. In each of 2 sessions participants
made 95 choices between two options involving between 3 to 12
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moderately painful electric shocks, delivered at between 4 to 51
trials in the future. All choices were genuine, with shock delivered
faithfully according to subjects’ choices.
The painful shocks occurred within a 5 second stimulus train,
and the intensity of each discrete shock did not vary. Since the
duration of the stimulus was constant, increasing number of shocks
was equivalent to an increasing shock rate. The number of shocks
within the stimulus train followed a Poisson distribution with
uniform probability of receiving a shock at each sampled time
interval. Participants were briefed on the probabilistic nature of
the outcomes and were informed of the number of shocks they
could on average expect to receive for a particular outcome, that
is, the mean of the distribution, where it was assumed that
participants made their choices based on this number. This was
done purely to embed the experiment into a more naturalistic
context, and hence elicit more considered choices.
After providing consent, participants underwent a standardized
thresholding procedure [40,41]. The aim of this procedure was to
control for between participant variations in pain perception, so
that the maximum shock rate used during the experiment
corresponded to an approximately equivalent subjective level of
discomfort for each participant. We aimed to set a current level
such that the five second stimulus at the maximum shock rate (2.8
shocks/s) was rated as moderately severe pain by each participant.
To achieve this we used an expected shock rate of 2.8 shocks/s
whilst varying current amplitude. Participants provided a visual
analog pain rating for each stimulus train on a continuous scale
from 0 (not painful) to 10 (intolerable pain). Current level was
increased in small increments until the participant rated the
stimulus as 6 out of 10. The staircase procedure was then repeated,
allowing participants to adapt to initial anxiety about the shocks.
This procedure determined a single current level corresponding to
moderately severe pain for each participant. At the end of the
experiment we also verified that increasing the mean shock rate
within the range used for the experiment corresponded to
monotonic increases in rated aversiveness, by asking participants
to provide visual analog ratings of the unpleasantness of stimulus
trains with different mean shock rates but constant current
amplitude. Shock rate was increased in increments of 2 shocks/5s,
starting from the baseline mean rate of 2 shocks/5s up to the
maximum rate of 14 shocks/5s at a constant current level equal to
that used during the choice phase. This was followed by a
symmetrical decreasing staircase in which shock rate was
decreased by the same increment, thus controlling for adaptation
effects. 2 out of the 35 participants were excluded from the analysis
on the basis of these ratings, since at the end of the experiment
they rated the maximum shock rate as below 4/10 (which
corresponded to ‘‘mild pain’’ on the visual analog rating scale),
suggesting that significant adaptation had occurred over the course
of the experiment.
Prior to the intertemporal choice phase, participants were
briefed with on-screen instructions that embedded the task in a
naturalistic health-related scenario. We collected intertemporal
choice data in two blocks, the order of which was counterbalanced
across participants: a block in which outcomes were framed as an
increase in shock rate, referred to as the pain frame and an
otherwise identical experimental block in which outcomes were
framed as a decrease in shock rate, referred to as the relief frame
(see Text S1 for a full description of the information given to
participants). Prior to making choices participants received six
samples of five second stimulus trains at two different shock rates,
corresponding to the minimum and maximum rates used during
the experiment, of 2 shocks/5s (0.4 shocks/s) and 14 shocks/5s
(2.8 shocks/s). Choice blocks proceeded according to a trial-based
design in which the unit of time was a single trial and participants’
choices determined outcomes on future trials. The sequence of
events across a series of trials is shown in Figure 1.
On each trial the default outcome was a five-second shock train
with mean 2 shocks/5s (0.4 shocks/s), which was referred to as a
‘‘Baseline Episode’’. Participants’ choices determined outcomes
with higher shock rates, referred to as ‘‘Severe Episodes’’.
Participants were informed that their choices would not change
the total number of pain episodes, only their timing and severity.
When presenting choice options, shock rate was expressed in the
pain frame as the expected number of extra shocks per five seconds
above the baseline rate and in the relief frame as the expected
number of shocks to be relieved per five seconds from an expected
maximum rate. The timing of outcomes was expressed as the
number of trials in the future. Since we made no a priori
assumptions about the direction of participants’ time preference,
there were an equal number of choices in which the delayed
outcome had a higher expected shock rate as choices in which the
sooner outcome had a higher expected shock rate. The
presentation of outcome options was counterbalanced and
randomized such that sooner outcome options appeared on the
left-hand side of the screen on half of trials, and on the right-hand
side in the other half of trials.
There were two types of trial: Choice Trials and No Choice
Trials. The latter are necessary to absorb the outcomes of all the
Choice Trials, such that all choices faithfully and precisely led to
their outcomes. In each run there were 95 Choice Trials and an
approximately equal number of No Choice Trials. On Choice
Trials participants were first presented with a choice between two
options for a Severe Episode, where each detailed its timing and
expected shock rate. After a choice had been made, there followed
the painful episode (five-second outcome stimulus) for that trial,
whose shock rate was determined by previous choices. On No
Choice Trials participants were presented with a screen saying
‘‘No Choice This Time’’, which was displayed for a constant delay
of 1s, and followed directly by the painful episode for that trial.
Choices and outcomes were interleaved: for example if a
participant chose on trial one to receive ‘‘a Severe Episode with
nine extra shocks, five trials in the future’’, then following their
choice on trial six they would experience an outcome with a mean
shock rate of nine shocks above the baseline. The outcome for trial
one would then be a Baseline Episode, as was the case for all trials
not referenced by a previous choice. Prior to each experimental
run we generated a novel trial order using a random permutation
that was bounded such that no two Choice Trials referred to an
outcome on the same trial, and participants were informed of this
fact. Although Choice Trials and No Choice Trials were randomly
interspersed, the frequency of the latter necessarily increased
towards the end of the experimental run, in order to ensure that
choice delays did not extend beyond the end of the experiment.
Shocks were delivered using a Digitimer (Letchworth Garden
City, England) DS7 constant current stimulator through silver
chloride surface electrodes placed approximately 3 cm apart on the
dorsum of the left hand. Each individual shock consisted of a single
200 ms square-wave pulse. Throughout the experiment the partic-
ipant sat in front of a computer monitor; where trials were presented
on-screen, and decisions were indicated using two keys on the
keyboard. The software package COGENT 2000 (University
College London) was used for stimulus presentation and response
acquisition. At the end of the session participants were fully
debriefed and given an opportunity to make any comments.
Model fitting procedures. To estimate the likelihood of
each of the models, we used assumed a standard probabilistic
model of action selection in which the probability of choosing
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option i over option j depends on a softmax function with the
following form:
p Choose ið Þ~ exp bUTOTAL ið Þð Þ
exp bUTOTAL ið Þð Þzexp bUTOTAL jð Þð Þ , ð12Þ
where p Choose ið Þ is the probability of choosing option i over
option j, and b is the inverse temperature parameter. Higher
values of b lead to behavior becoming more deterministic for
choosing the option with higher utility. The above can be
rearranged to the following form,
p Choose ið Þ~ 1
1zexp b UTOTAL jð Þ{UTOTAL ið Þð Þð Þ , ð13Þ
which demonstrates that the probability of choosing an option in
this case depends on the difference between the utility of the two
options. Simplex optimization was performed using the Matlab
(Mathworks, MA, USA) fminsearch optimization tool (Nelder-Mead
search algorithm [42]), with the addition of bound constraints by
transformation, to estimate the parameters for each model in order
to maximize log likelihood of the model parameters (by
minimizing the negative log likelihood) given the observed binary
choices for each subject. The optimizer was called within a
random multi-started overlay (RMsearch), with 100 starting points
selected from a uniform distribution between the parameter
bounds, in order to reduce convergence on local minima. In
addition, for each subject 1000 iterations of the optimization were
performed, and the maximum likelihood estimate across all
iterations was selected. Discount parameters, cP and cD, and the
dread parameter, a, were bounded between 0 and 1. For the Fixed
Dread Cost model, the dread cost, A, was bounded between 0 and
250. The inverse temperature parameter, b, was bounded
between 0 and 1000. As an additional safeguard against
convergence on local minima, we also performed a grid search
for the three best performing models with three-dimensional
parameter spaces (Constant Dread, Undiscounted Exponential
Dread and the restricted version of Discounted Exponential
Dread), evaluating the functions over the entire parameter space,
by sampling on a log scale 100 values of each parameter between
the bounds. A second grid search was then performed at ten times
this resolution in the regions of the maximum likelihood estimates
resulting from both the first grid search and the Simplex
optimization. Figure S7 plots the results of the second grid search
against the Simplex optimization results for each parameter across
the three dread-discounting models. Differences in the maximized
likelihood between the two search strategies were negligible, and
therefore Simplex estimates were retained for the purposes of model
comparison. For models with more than three parameters we
confirmed that the model-fitting procedure had indeed minimized
the negative log-likelihood, by numerically computing the second
partial derivatives of the likelihood surface with respect to each
parameter in the region of the maximum likelihood estimate.
Model fitting resulted in a set of maximum likelihood parameter
estimates for each subject. Model comparison was performed at
the group level (fixed effects), by summation of log likelihoods
across participants. Selection between models proceeded using the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [43], where
BIC~{2:Lz2:k:ln nð Þ, ð14Þ
and L is the maximized group level log likelihood, k is the number
of free parameters in the model and n the number of independent
observations. The BIC favors models with higher likelihood
estimates and penalizes increasing model complexity, where lower
values of BIC indicate a more favorable model fit. Where
appropriate, nested models were compared using likelihood ratio
significance tests, where fixed-effects comparisons on the summed
group-level likelihoods were of primary interest. For these model
comparisons, the total likelihood was summed across all choices
regardless of frame (pain or relief).
Analysis of framing effects. To examine which model
parameters were capable of accounting for choice variability
between pain and relief frames, we fitted the general form
Exponential Dread model to data from both frames separately,
whilst constraining selected parameters to be the same across both
frames (Figure 5C). The fully unrestricted model (All-Framing) had
eight parameters, namely: aPain, aRelief ,cP{Pain,cP{Relief ,
cD{Pain,cD{Relief ,bPain and bRelief . Alternative restricted models
were tested in which only a single parameter at time was allowed
to vary between frames (a-framing, cP-framing, cD-framing and b-
Framing), as well as the fully restricted model in which all three
parameters were fixed between frames (No-Framing). a-Framing
had the following five parameters: aPain, aRelief ,cP, cD and b. cP-
Framing had the following five parameters: a,cP{Pain,cP{Relief ,cD
and b. cD-Framing had the following five parameters:
a,cD{Pain,cD{Relief ,cP and b. b-Framing had the following five
parameters: a,cP, cD bPain, and bRelief . No-Framing had the
following four parameters: a,cP, cD and b. The goodness-of-fit of
the alternative restricted models was compared using the summed
BIC values across both frames, as well as likelihood ratio tests
between the two leading models.
Experiment 2
Participants. 30 participants took part in the experiment.
Participants were recruited by advertisement on the website of the
University College London Psychology Subject Pool. Choices were
administered online using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics.com;
Provo, UT). The study procedure was approved by the joint
ethics committee of The National Hospital for Neurology and
Neurosurgery and the Institute of Neurology (UCL).
Procedure and data analysis. Participants were introduced
to the following scenario:
You are due to have a routine dental appointment. The appointment will
last for 15 minutes. The appointment is non-urgent but must be booked
now to occur sometime in the next year. Importantly the timing will not
affect your dental health: having the appointment sooner will provide no
added health benefits. However the experience will be very
uncomfortable, and at times painful. Exactly how painful will depend
on when you choose to have the appointment. The pain will only last for
the length of the appointment: you do not experience dental pain at any
other time. The dental surgery is very close to where you live, so you will
be able to attend an appointment almost immediately if you choose to. As
far as your diary is concerned, any of the appointment times are equally
possible for you.
Participants were offered binary choices between different
timings for the dental appointment, in units of days. The sooner
appointment was always designated as occurring ‘‘today’’. The
later appointment occurred at delays of 1, 5, 13, 32, 89 or 237
days. In each case participants were told how painful they could
expect the appointment to be on a scale of 0% to 100%, where
100% represents the worse imaginable dental pain. The outcome
magnitudes were 60, 55, 51 46, 37 and 16% dental pain. At each
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possible delay, each possible magnitude was paired with an
outcome of 60% dental pain. Options were counterbalanced, so
that there were an equal number of choices in which the larger
magnitude pain was the delayed option as choices in which the
smaller magnitude pain was the delayed option. So that the
timings appeared plausible, participants were asked to imagine
that it was currently a weekday morning. Data analysis followed
the same methodology as described above for Experiment 1.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Temporal value functions predicted by
alternative models. For each panel the value of a shock is
plotted against increasing delay to its delivery. The value of
immediate shock is given by the intersection of the curves with the
vertical axis; for purposes of clarity the scales of the vertical axes
are arbitrary and differ between the plots. Parameters of the
function are displayed next to each. The top left panel depicts
simple exponential discounting with positive rate, with the result
that the prospective utility of shock becomes less negative the
further it is delayed into the future. The top right panel depicts
exponential discounting with negative rate, a model which we
reject a priori due to its implausible prediction that very small
values of distantly delayed shock ought to be equivalent to severe
immediate shock. The middle left panel depicts a model in which
all values of delayed shock carry a fixed subtractive cost, A (here
set arbitrarily to a value of 5), with the discount factor cP set to
0.95 (see text). The remaining panels depict dread-discounting
models as labelled Constant Dread, Undiscounted Exponential
Dread (denoted by the prefix U) and Restricted Discounted
Exponential Dread (denoted by the prefix D). For the Exponential
Dread models depicted, the discount rate used to determine dread
is equal to the discount rate applied to consumption of shock, cP.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Parameterization of the Constant Dread
model. A range of temporal value functions predictable by a
Constant Dread model, at different values of the two free
parameters cP~c and a. A: Effects of increasing a (left to right)
at lower (top row) and higher (second row) values of c. It is evident
that at small values of a the model approaches positive exponential
discounting (top left panel). Simple exponential discounting is
produced when a=0. At positive a the functions approach linear
decreases, where a determines the slope. B: Effects of decreasing c
(left to right) at lower (top row) and higher (second row) values of a.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Parameterization of the general form Expo-
nential Dread model. A range of temporal value functions
predictable by an Exponential Dread model with separate cP and
cD, at different values of the three parameters cP, cD and a. The
model allows for points of maximal aversion at intermediate values
of delay. A: Effects of increasing a (left to right) at lower (top row)
and higher (second row) values of cP with a high value of cD. It is
evident that at small values of a the model approaches positive
exponential discounting (top left panel). Simple exponential
discounting is produced when a=0. B: Effects of decreasing cD
(i.e. increasing the discounting of dread; left to right) at lower (top
row) and higher (second row) values of a.
(TIF)
Figure S4 Parameterization of the Undiscounted Expo-
nential Dread model. A range of temporal value functions
predictable by an Exponential Dread model with cD~cP, where
dread itself is not subject to discounting, at different values of the
two free parameters c~cD~cP, and a. A: Effects of increasing a
(left to right) at lower (top row) and higher (second row) values of c.
It is evident that at small values of a the model approaches positive
exponential discounting (top left panel). Simple exponential
discounting is produced when a=0. At positive a aversiveness
(negative value) increases at a decreasing rate with delay, where
both a and c influence the asymptotic boundary. B: Effects of
decreasing c (left to right) at lower (top row) and higher (second
row) values of a.
(TIF)
Figure S5 Parameterization of the Restricted Discount-
ed Exponential Dread model. A range of temporal value
functions predictable by an Exponential Dread model with
cD~cP, where dread itself is temporally discounted, at different
values of the two free parameters c and a. The model allows for
points of maximal aversion at intermediate values of delay. A:
Effects of increasing a (left to right) at lower (top row) and higher
(second row) values of c. It is evident that at small values of a the
model approaches positive exponential discounting (top left panel).
Simple exponential discounting is produced when a=0. B: Effects
of decreasing c (left to right) at lower (top row) and higher (second
row) values of a.
(TIF)
Figure S6 Utility functions derived from subjective pain
ratings. Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) pain ratings as a function
of stimulus shock rate for the 25 participants included in the
modeling analysis. VAS ratings were made on a scale ranging from
0 (no pain) to 10 (intolerable pain). Ratings scores were fitted with
a 3-parameter concave Weibull function, using least squares
minimisation, indicated by the dashed lines on each plot. These
functions were then entered as negative utility functions for pain as
a function of shock rate in a second modeling analysis of the
intertemporal choice data.
(TIF)
Figure S7 Grid search of parameter space. Grid search
was performed over the entire parameter space of the three best
fitting dread-discounting models with up to three dimensional
parameter spaces (Constant Dread, Undiscounted Exponential
Dread and the restricted version of Discounted Exponential
Dread) in order to verify that the random multi-started Simplex
optimization procedure successfully avoided local minima in the
likelihood surface. Maximum likelihood estimates resulting from
grid search of the three parameters are plotted against the
estimates resulting from Simplex optimization on a log scale.
Outliers, representing cases in which the Simplex routine
encountered local minima, are few in number, and in each case
in the maximised log likelihood between the two search routines
are negligible (they do not change the results of model
comparison).
(TIF)
Figure S8 Fitted temporal value functions: Negative
time preference sub-group. Empirical temporal value func-
tions predicted by the cP-framing version of the general form
Exponential Dread model for individuals categorized behaviorally
as having consistent negative time preference: subject numbers are
indicated above each plot (corresponding to Table S1). Asterisks
indicate subjects who showed significant framing effects in the
expected direction at the behavioral level (Fisher exact test,
p,0.05). Note variable scaling of the vertical axes for some
individuals, a function of variable softmax temperatures. The blue
line represents the value function for the relief frame, the red line
the value function for the pain frame. In each case, where
significant behavioral framing effects occurred, this was captured
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by the model. It can be appreciated that for the majority of
subjects the value function for the pain frame appears to lie below
that in the relief frame, consistent with higher dread.
(TIF)
Figure S9 Fitted temporal value functions: zero, posi-
tive and reversing time preference sub-groups. Empirical
temporal value functions predicted by the cP-framing version of
the general form Exponential Dread model for individuals
categorized behaviorally as having either zero time preference
(A), consistent positive time preference (B), or negative time
preference followed by positive time preference (C). Subject
numbers are indicated above each plot (corresponding to Table
S1). The asterisks indicate participants with significant framing
effects at the behavioural level for individual participants (Fisher
exact test, p,0.05), the prefix ‘‘rev’’ indicates a single subject (7)
who showed a significant framing effect in the direction opposite to
that expected. Note variable scaling of the vertical axes for some
individuals, a function of variable softmax temperatures. The blue
line represents the value function for the relief frame, the red line
the value function for the pain frame.
(TIF)
Table S1 Choice frequency: Experiment 1. The table
outlines the percentage of choices in which the sooner painful
episode was chosen for each participant, on both pain and relief
frames, as well as the percentage difference between the two
frames (percentage sooner choice on the pain frame minus the
percentage sooner choice on the relief frame). The latter indicates
the size of the framing effect; positively signed values of this
difference indicate that the participant choose sooner pain more
frequently in the pain frame, indicating a framing effect in the
expected direction. The final two columns show the p-value and
hypothesis test of a Fisher exact test on the percentage choices in
each frame; a 1 in the final column indicates a significant framing
effect in the expected direction at an individual level. Table S1
outlines the overall frequencies of choosing sooner pain in both
pain and relief frames in Experiment 1. The eight participants
listed in gray chose sooner pain 100% of the time in at least one of
the two frames, rendering their data unsuitable for model-based
analysis. 10 out of 33 participants displayed significant framing
effects in the expected direction at an individual level (Fisher exact
test p,0.05).
(DOC)
Table S2 Model parameters for the general form
Exponential Dread model with cP-framing: Experiment
1. Maximum likelihood parameter estimates are listed for the five
parameters of the general form Exponential Dread model with cP-
framing for each participant included in the modeling analysis for
Experiment 1. Participant numbers correspond to those in Table
S1.
(DOC)
Text S1 Information given to participants in Experi-
ment 1. Details the instructions in Experiment 1 which embed
the task within a health-related scenario and distinguish the two
frames.
(DOC)
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